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Introduction 
The Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations are structural in the evolution of the 
Brazilian international relations because of the political, economic, strategic 
and ideological weight that the U.S. holds on the country's agenda. This weight 
results from a complex combination of factors that involves the nature of the 
U.S. power resources, its projection capacity and Brazil's perception of itself 
and about such partner. This trend of the debate ideologization and internal 
polarization that breaks down into currents which are in favor or against an 
autonomous foreign policy, in opposition to the alignment with the U.S., has 
remained until the twenty-first century, going through the administration of 
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003/2010) and reaching that of Dilma Rousseff 
(2011/2014). 
Whereas in the Lula administration the international assertiveness 
prevailed and raised Brazil's global presence, even facing the U.S. and despite 
criticism, Dilma Rousseff‟s period seems to represent an inflection point in this 
process. Such difference would correspond to an attempt to reconcile the aspects 
of autonomy and alignment. Nonetheless, this process has proved to be quite 
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controversial and sensitive, since the option for an autonomous foreign policy 
refers to a project of state and not just a project of government. This equation 
failed to take into account the comprehensive elements of the exchange and the 
U.S. position as hegemon.  
Facing this scenario, this article seeks to analyze the evolution of the 
bilateral relations in the Rousseff administration, identifying its main pillars, 
controversies, limitations and opportunities, having as backdrop the broader 
context of Brazil's international relations as an emerging country. It is a 
contemporary analysis, which will bring a study based on conjunctural themes 
and long-term considerations about the strategic views of both partners. For 
that purpose, the text is divided into two parts: diversification and 
accommodation (2011/2012), detachment, rethinking and stagnation 
(2013/2014). 
 
 
Diversification and Accommodation (2011/2012) 
Elected in 2010, President Dilma Rousseff represented the continuity of the 
Lula administration. Domestically, this commitment was clearly preserved, 
including the expansion of the social agenda and the investment increase in 
sectors as infrastructure (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento-PAC and the 
works related to the major sporting events of 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 
Summer Olympics) and affordable housing with the Minha Casa, Minha Vida 
program. In terms of foreign policy, however, this continuity began to be 
questioned, evidencing a possible break in the international relations as well as 
the rapprochement with the United States.  
Assessing the foreign policy when it comes to the strategic thinking and 
the bilateral relations, a moderate continuity is observed, which brings the risk 
of stagnation and low profile. Although there is not a paradigm rupture, by 
keeping the focus on the South-South relations and multilateralism, the 
2011/2012 years presented some modifications: first, a variation in style 
between both administrations, with President Dilma practicing the Presidential 
Diplomacy in a less intense way; second, an attempt to reshape the exchange 
with the United States.  
The reshaping has an ambiguous character: to minimize internal 
criticism towards the foreign policy without reframing the country into the U.S. 
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orbit. Such criticisms had been high in the 2010 presidential elections, being 
focused on the Iran-Brazil-Turkey Tripartite Nuclear Agreement and the 
human rights theme, symbolized in the sentence of death by stoning of Sakineh 
Ashtiani by the Ahmadinejad government, which Brazil would not criticize (not 
taking into account the fact that the country was negotiating the pardon). Both 
matters were criticized by the United States and used by the opposition. In the 
post-2011 the Ashtiani theme vanished, and the United States, after its pressure 
for the non-approval of the Tripartite Agreement, closed a new nuclear deal 
with Iran, similar to that of 2010. The U.S. positions went against Turkey, too, 
and they reflect its shrinking in face of regional pivots. 
The Dilma presidency began under the sign of compromising on 
controversial themes, with emphasis on the electoral conjuncture. Therefore, a 
possible hypothesis is that this tactical adjustment emerges more from an 
internal debate than from the need of repositioning to obtain U.S. recognition, 
since the perception of Brazil as a power already existed.  
It was not a change in the policy of state but an adjustment in the 
policy of government. The appointment of former Brazilian Ambassador in 
Washington Antonio Patriota (2007/2009) to the position of Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, who had previously been the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs2 in the 
final years of Ambassador Celso Amorim administration (2009/2010), came up 
as an important element. The idea was to offer a counterpoint to the Lula 
administration for the domestic public, but one that could bring advantages, as 
the support to the permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. 
However, what was the status of the bilateral relation and which were the paths 
in the Dilma Rousseff administration?   
When Rousseff took office in January 2011, the Brazil-U.S. bilateral 
relations were at a level of Strategic Dialogue. Established in 2005 by the 
administrations of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003/2010) and George W. Bush 
(2001/2008), the Strategic Dialogue represented the U.S. acknowledgement that 
Brazil laid in a new position in the world power balance. It was defined that the 
partnership held global implications and was not restricted to regional themes. 
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This did not reflect full convergence of interests or elimination of conflict, but 
rather a status of exchange between powers. 
Despite the criticisms from pro-alignment groups towards President 
Lula, the very establishment of the Dialogue was only possible because of the 
change in foreign policy. Undertaken by President Lula and Ambassador Celso 
Amorim as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, changes allowed for the maturation 
and strenghten of the agenda through the resumption of the South-South 
cooperation and the Third-Worldism identity. The 1990s positions of 
subordination and alignment were dropped, recovering an autonomous vision 
and a development project. 
The project has internal and external dimensions. Internally, the 
national power reinforcement was sought through economic adjustments to 
guarantee stability and growth and to reduce vulnerability.  The government 
developed actions to correct social inequalities, for the technical cooperation 
potential and soft power: Fome Zero, Farmácia Popular and Bolsa Família. In 
the same referential is Brazil‟s participation in the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti, also known as MINUSTAH, since 2004 as a leader. 
The integration deepening in South America was observed (Southern 
Common Market-MERCOSUL, Initiative for the Integration of the Regional 
Infrastructure of South America-IIRSA, Union of South American Nations-
UNASUL and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States-CELAC), 
as well as the active participation in multilateral negotiations in traditional 
organizations (United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Financial G-20), 
the creation of alliances of variable geometry among the emerging countries 
(India-Brazil-South Africa-IBSA; Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa-
BRICS; Trade G-20), the reinforcement of extra-regional partnerships with the 
EU, and the resumption of a South-South policy in Africa, Asia and Middle 
East. The Summits of South American-Arab countries (ASPA, in Portuguese) 
and African-South American countries (ASA) were unprecedented signals. 
Insofar as the United States did not take part in the twenty-first 
century regional integration arrangements, a counterpoint has been offered to 
the traditional Inter-American system created in the Cold War and based on 
strategic-military mechanisms, the 1947 TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance) and the 1948 OAS (Organization of American States). 
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Such institutions became U.S. bridgehead from 1947 to 1989, and they were 
emptied by the South American initiatives.  
This system and the U.S.-Cuba relations, characterized by the trade 
embargo in place since the 1959 Communist Revolution, demonstrate the 
freezing in regional policies. These policies were somewhat updated in the 1990s 
with the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) and the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) that sought to establish the Hemispheric Free Trade 
Zone, without any alterations in the U.S. vision of the region as a "reserve 
zone". Among the proposed projects, the ones created were NAFTA, the Free 
Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico (1994), and 
CAFTA, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (2007), as well as bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Peru and Colombia were established. 
The integration led by Brazil questioned the projects of asymmetric 
social and economic conditionalities (Washington Consensus). By rebuilding, 
and leading, changes in its regional surrounding and at global scale, Brazil made 
itself present in the world, with autonomous identity and interests. As 
mentioned above, this culminated in 2005 in the Strategic Dialogue and the 
definition of Brazil and other emerging countries as pillars of the new world 
order. In 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice considered the emerging 
countries as "stakeholders of the world order". To this term, it was added in 
2010 that of the "new centers of global power", of President Obama's National 
Security Strategy (NSS-2010).   
Nevertheless, this scenario is not characterized only by the recognition 
of Brazil by the U.S., which takes the attempts of engagement by the 
hegemonic power. It is also marked by the crisis of this hegemony, provoked by 
George W. Bush: the military unilateralism and the intervention operations of 
the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). This focus 
on the Eurasian system generated the imperial overextension and the 2008 
economic crisis.  
Besides the engagement, the containment of Brazil and other emerging 
countries became present with the criticisms towards the Brazilian and Chinese 
"neoimperialism" in the Third World, strategic measures in the military sector 
regarding areas as South America and Africa, and new economic alliances in 
Europe and the Pacific. Such movements unfolded: reinforcement of the 
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existing mechanisms and creation of new projection instruments by Bush junior 
(and which were going to be completed by Barack Obama).  
In the first dimension, the reinforcement of mechanisms, is found the 
investment increase in Plan Colombia and the United States Southern 
Command (USSOUTHCOM). Specifically, the Plan Colombia of war on drugs 
was launched in the 2000s by the Bill Clinton administration (1993/2000). The 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative3 established the U.S.-Colombia cooperation in 
combating drug trafficking through aid and the military presence of U.S. troops 
on Colombian soil (including the cession of bases) and fumigation of coca crops 
in the Amazon region, with effects over all the countries that share it (as Brazil 
and Venezuela).  
Since 2001, Plan Colombia incorporated the language of the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWT) with the definition of "narco-terrorism" as a threat to the 
hemispheric security. This classification was brought to identify a new threat 
category: the use of narco-trafficking money to finance terrorist groups. The 
launch of the Plan coincided with that of IIRSA, the project of infrastructure 
integration led by Brazil in South America, in a context of autonomy. 
Reinforced by the Lula administration, this project began in the late 1990s, 
mainly in the Andean region with the rise of the twenty-first century Socialism 
project of Chávez, with critical content towards the hegemony.  
Classifications as "Rogue States" and "Axis of Evil" were applied in 
these situations, denoting the existence of authoritarian governments in the 
region, prone to disrespecting the norms of the international community (in the 
case of the Latin "Axis of Evil", Cuba and Venezuela were identified by the 
Department of State as the main risks)4. These perceptions were repudiated by 
the local diplomacies, demonstrating their concerns with the risk of 
interventionism, stressed by the launch of the Bush Doctrine of preemptive 
action in 2002. 
                                                 
3 Since 2008, the Mérida Initiative in Mexico complemented the war on drugs. 
4 In addition to the category of Rogue State, the United States created that of Failed State to refer to 
nations without internal organization, as terrorist safe havens and marked by civil war and 
humanitarian tragedies. The post-9/11 Axis of Evil was composed of Iran, Iraq and North Korea, to 
which Syria and Libya were later added. 
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The narco-terrorism and rogue states issues are related to the expansion 
of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) action, with the 
identification of the Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay Triple Frontier as focus of 
international terrorism since 2001. According to U.S. analyses, groups as Al-
Qaeda and Hezbollah would use the area, with the presence of terrorist cells in 
South America and sponsorship of illegal activities as drug trafficking and 
money laundering. The city of Foz do Iguaçu would be the focus of this 
movement (USSOUTHCOM 2014). 
The strengthening of the USSOUTHCOM also had as its part the 
reactivation of the U.S. Navy Fourth Fleet in 2008, which had been created in 
1943 and disestablished in 1950, when its responsibilities were taken over by the 
Command related to NATO and North Atlantic (Second Fleet, in turn 
disestablished in 2011 in the process of restructuring of the forces in the 
Atlantic, Pacific and Afro-Asian world). The resumption of these operations 
was justified by the Department of Defense as part of the rise of state and 
transnational security risks in the Western Hemisphere.  
In the twenty-first century, the South Atlantic5, the area between 
South America and Africa, has regained its relevance for various reasons: gas 
and oil reserves, passing zone for raw materials and energy resources, and the 
growing Sino-Indo-Brazilian influence. The sum of Plan Colombia with the 
Fourth Fleet represents a relevant U.S. geopolitical move to project power 
where it had lesser strategic presence. These actions seek to provide a capacity 
for rapid deployment in the South Atlantic and collide with the Brazilian and 
African stance of demilitarization of the area. These different positions are not 
unprecedented, resuming the divergences of the 1980s regarding the creation of 
ZOPACAS (South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone), by Brazil, and the 
establishment of SATO (South Atlantic Treaty Organization), by the U.S. 
According to Brazil's White Paper on National Defense (2012), the 
South Atlantic, also known as the "Blue Amazon", is an area of high relevance 
for the country for the same reasons it is for the United States,  
 
In the Brazilian maritime area, over the Atlantic Ocean, important navigation 
                                                 
5 See Austral v.2, n.3: http://seer.ufrgs.br;index.php/austral/issue/view/1891. 
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routes cross, which are vital to the national economy. There are the Brazilian pre-
salt reserves, of high economic, political and strategic significance (...) The 
projection eastward leads to the West African countries, where the Cape route is 
highlighted, for being a considerable strategic way of communication of Asia and 
Africa with the Northern Hemisphere. The segment that extends from São Roque 
cape to the river Oiapoque projects Brazil to the northern portion of Africa, to 
Western Europe, Panama Canal, the Caribbean and Central and North America.  
(Ministério da Defesa 2012, n/p) 
 
In the geopolitical and geo-economic scope of South Atlantic, there is 
another U.S. action that is inserted in the new mechanisms of projection: the 
establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2008. Formerly 
part of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), the geographic area of this 
command overlaps in the South Atlantic the forces of the Southern Command, 
and, as its South American part, seeks to occupy spaces and deter Sino-
Brazilian and Indian advance in Africa. The motivation is similar to that of the 
Fourth Fleet reactivation.  
Those are complementary efforts that represent the acknowledgement 
of the Brazilian force and its potential of threat. Independent of these moves, 
and parallel to and convergent with them, a solid base is built for the bilateral 
relation, sustained by these very factors. This is the complex level upon which 
the Dilma-Obama exchange is built: Brazil remained recognized as a power. So, 
why did the Dilma administration begin with attempts of tactical adjustment 
of the exchange? 
Unlike other powers as China and India, which tend to deepen the 
bargain with the U.S. in the same proportion that their force rises, Brazil faces 
internal pro-alignment pressure that hampers consensus building around 
autonomy. Thus, as indicated, it was under Dilma that the tactical adjustment 
came up in 2011, in a context of relative decline in the diplomatic offensive. 
This movement began in President Barack Obama's visit to Brazil in March, 
which was for some internal groups considered "agenda clearing" (a vision 
propagated by the media). However, when Obama arrived in Brazil, he was 
visiting a country considered a global power in the twenty-first century context, 
the result of almost a decade of national strengthening rather than in response 
to the recent changes Dilma sought to implement after only two months of the 
administration.  
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What mattered most was the tactic to recover areas in the regional 
context, which could not be detached from the global: continuing economic 
crisis in the U.S. and European Union, strengthening of the emerging countries 
and their international geopolitical and geo-economic projection, deepening of 
the South American integration, instability in the Iraq-Afghanistan Eurasian 
military theaters and the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010. The actions in 
Latin America are compensatory, without moving the U.S. focus from Eurasia. 
While in Brazil, President Obama announced the beginning of the UNSC-
authorized military operation into Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, for 
humanitarian reasons.  The UNSC voting that authorized it was not consensual 
and showed a representative pattern of the new global forces: the countries that 
abstained were permanent and temporary Security Council members, China and 
Russia, Brazil, India and Germany.6  
What were the concrete results of the visit? And of the tactical 
adjustment? Regarding the visit's media content, a formal sponsorship to 
Brazil's insertion as a UNSC permanent member and the abolition of visas had 
no advances. Unlike India and Japan that rely on formal support statements, 
Brazil had one of "appreciation" only. Visas were kept, upon promise of 
facilitation. 
There were changes in the 2005 Strategic Dialogue, with the elevation 
of its components to the presidential level. The goal was to signal that the 
relation was a priority and aggregate to the negotiations more visibility and 
diplomatic dimensions, placing them as a task of both Executives and agencies. 
This institutionalization defines greater regularity in meetings, making them 
permanent forums. The main dialogues are the Global Partnership Dialogue 
(GPD), the Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD), the Commission on 
Economic and Trade Relations, the Economic Partnership Dialogue, the Trade 
Partnership Dialogue and the Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED). They updated 
forums as the Brazil-U.S. Chambers of Commerce, as well as corporate forums 
                                                 
6 Brazil offers a criticism against the humanitarian interventions justified by the UN‟s "responsibility to 
protect" concept, by contrasting it with that of "responsibility while protecting". The aim is 
questioning the criteria that rule such actions. 
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(Brazil-U.S. Business Council) and of the civil society.  
In the scope of the "Brazil-U.S. Global Partnership Dialogue" (GPD), 
priorities were defined as follows: Trilateral Cooperation, Education 
Cooperation, Space Cooperation, Cooperation for Social Inclusion, and 
Cooperation in the Health Area. Among these, the education cooperation was 
strongly represented by the Science Without Borders Program, sponsored by 
the Brazilian government and the funding agencies in the education sector at 
the level of research and undergraduate and graduate education, CNPq and 
CAPES, which aims to train Brazilian students in foreign institutions (Diálogo 
da Parceria Global, Brasil-Estados Unidos 2012).  
Another growing area was that of trilateral cooperation, which 
establishes a joint action of Brazil and the U.S. in third countries especially in 
Central America, the Caribbean and Africa. The main programs developed 
concern food safety, fighting HIV/AIDS, fighting forced and children labor, 
cooperation in biofuels, the environment and conservation, and drug 
trafficking.  
In 2011 were signed the Agreement on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, Partnership for the Development of Aviation Biofuels, 
Memorandum of Understanding on Dimensions of Biodiversity, Memorandum 
of Understanding for the Establishment of the Brazil-U.S. Strategic Dialogue 
Program, Memorandum of Understanding for the Implementation of Technical 
Cooperation in Third Countries in the Field of Decent Work, and the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Support the Organization of 
Major Global Sporting Events.  
Regarding the Strategic Energy Dialogue, the launch of the detailed 
program of energy cooperation defined four areas: biofuels, renewable energy 
and energy efficiency, oil and natural gas, and nuclear security. Since 2011, the 
meetings of the technical groups as well as the energy ministries have been 
frequent, without interruption. The United States pledged to work with Brazil 
on the achievement and formatting of the Rio+20 agenda, the 2012 conference 
on the environment. 
One of the key elements of this energy partnership lies in the 
exploration of the Brazilian pre-salt and the concern with the increasing 
participation of Chinese companies in the process. Despite U.S. advances in the 
exploration of shale for generating gas and oil, touted as an "unconventional 
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revolution" (Yergin 2014) that would make the country autonomous, the 
extension and environmental viability of this production remain in question. 
However, many claim that the use of shale, combined with the expansion of oil 
exploration in protected environmental areas such as Alaska and the Gulf of 
Mexico, can change the world geopolitical and geo-economic panorama with the 
disengagement of troops and investment in key areas. 
The U.S. is interested in guaranteeing the access to the Brazilian pre-
salt, since it would allow for an energy partnership with a "friendly country", 
which offers fewer risks than the scenarios of Middle East, Central Asia and 
Africa (and that of Venezuela in Latin America). The military-strategic risks are 
included here, as well as the strong Sino-Indian competition. Insofar as there is 
no change in the U.S. consumption patterns and energy supply, it is arguable 
that any new internal (or even external) source would meet the demand.  
Defense and trade are other sectors in which the negotiations were kept. 
On the defense agenda, the innovation was the establishment of a strategic 
dialogue, which seeks to increase the joint training actions and threats 
identification. For the U.S. it is interesting to expand its exports in the military 
sector to Brazil and South America, hampering the development of 
technological autonomy, as well as the contacts with other nations that are 
active in this market. This dimension was accelerated upon the establishment of 
the CDS (Council of South American Defense) under UNASUL in 2008. CDS 
represented a qualitative leap forward in the South American security relations, 
composed of local countries only, aiming at cooperation and confidence 
building. It seeks to offer an alternative to its strategic repositioning, as Plan 
Colombia and the Fourth Fleet, as well as a way to contain and deter new 
attempts of military presence by the United States. Finally, it offers an 
autonomous regional mechanism to deal with security themes. 
With regard to trade, the downward trends in the bilateral flow were 
kept since there was no move towards the opening of the U.S. market or 
correction of protectionist and subsidy mechanisms. The interactions at the 
WTO and the locking of the Doha Round exemplify these dimensions, in 
addition to various contentions between both diplomacies. Some disputes as 
that of the orange juice are recurrent, whereas the contention on cotton has 
remained unsolved since 2002. In 2009 the WTO authorized Brazil to levy up to 
The Brazil-United States Bilateral Relations in the Dilma Rousseff Administration, 2011-2014 v.3, n.6. Jul/Dec. 2014 
 
22  
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations | v.3, n.6, Jul./Dec. 2014 
 
US$ 829 million in retaliation against the U.S., a decision which was rejected by 
the United States, which appealed and lost. In 2011 the United States agreed to 
pay Brazil's Cotton Institute US$ 147.3 million annually to compensate those 
figures and reform its Farm Bill, only to, soon after, suspend the payments in 
October 2013. Brazil's option was, in 2014, to set up a panel to press for the 
agreement implementation and the Farm Bill revision.  
Moreover, there was the dissonance in the WTO presidential election in 
which a coalition of Southern countries managed to elect Ambassador Roberto 
Azevedo in 2013, opposing the U.S.-backed candidate. A comparative analysis 
of Brazilian trade flows in the last five years, focusing on the Brazil-U.S. and 
Brazil-China bilateral partnerships, demonstrates that there have not been 
significant changes despite the Global Dialogues (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Balance of Trade – Exchanges 
Brazil-United States and Brazil-China* 
 
(Brazil and United States: US$ FOB) 
Year Exports 
U.S. 
Exports 
China 
Imports 
U.S. 
Imports 
China 
Net Exports 
with U.S. 
Net 
Exports 
with China 
2010 19.307 30.785 27.042 25.595 -7.735 5.190 
2011 25.805 44.315 33.962 32.788 -8.157 11.527 
2012 26.849 41.228 32.603 34.248 -5.754 6.980 
2013 11.575 22.957 17.587 17.585 -6.012 5.372 
2014** 12.792 23.880 17613 18.405 -4.821 5.475 
*Prepared by the author with data from MDIC 
** Figures up to June 2014 
 
The same blocking occurs at the G20 negotiations, which gained greater 
visibility after the 2008 global financial crisis. Although negotiations started at 
an intense pace after the crisis outbreak, they have been emptied in the last 
years due to the maintenance of U.S. and European unilateralism in the face of 
emerging countries' demands of adjustment of the economic agenda of recovery 
and reform of financial institutions. There remains a detachment between the 
policies of regulation and adjustment demanded by the emerging countries and 
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the agenda of the North. This detachment must be seen as one of the reasons for 
the strengthening of South-South alliances such as the BRICS. In July 2014, 
the creation of the BRICS bank demonstrated the strength of this organization. 
Furthering this panorama, the Obama administration intensified, and 
complemented, this process of containing the emerging countries started by 
Bush junior. To the positive rhetoric of cooperation, a more aggressive one was 
added:  
 
Countries like China, India, and Brazil are growing by leaps and bounds. We should 
welcome this development, for it has lifted hundreds of millions from poverty (...)  
and created new markets and opportunities (...). And yet, as this rapid change has 
taken place, it has become fashionable in some quarters to question whether the rise 
of these nations will accompany the decline of American and European influence 
around the world. Perhaps, the argument goes, these nations represent the future, 
and the time for our leadership has passed. That argument is wrong. The time for 
our leadership is now. It was the United States (...) and our democratic allies that 
shaped a world in which new nations could emerge. (Obama 2011a, n/p) 
 
There have been many allegations of a "new imperialism" against the 
emerging countries, be it Chinese (as in the words of former Secretary of State 
Clinton about the China-Africa relation) or Brazilian as aforementioned. Brazil 
has been accused of human rights violations and exploitation in economic 
activities in Africa and South America. The action of companies as Odebrecht, 
Petrobras, among others, has been the subject of numerous external criticisms. 
This offensive has been intensified, since both China and Brazil increased their 
power projection on both continents. Such criticisms are incorporated in the 
internal debate. 
The rhetorical offensive was accompanied by the actions of 
USSOUTHCOM/USAFRICOM, as well as by land military projection in South 
America. Obama has incorporated two containment initiatives, the Asian pivot 
and the European pivot, of economic and military character. The Asian pivot 
strategy presented in 2011, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), restructures 
the economic relations of the United States with Asia, bringing pressure to the 
Sino-Indian activities (and trying to revitalize the Japanese-American alliance), 
and which affects South America in its Pacific zone. There was a readjustment 
of military troops in USPACOM. The United States supports the establishment 
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of the Pacific Alliance in South America, composed of Chile, Peru, Mexico and 
Colombia, aiming to distance these nations from the integration projects of 
UNASUL/MERCOSUL. 
The European pivot, the Transatlantic Partnership, launched in 2013, 
establishes negotiations for a free trade zone between the United States and the 
European Union. It seeks to close the room for the emerging countries in both 
markets. For Brazil, it relativizes even more its importance on its partners' 
agenda and brings obstacles to the ongoing negotiations of the MERCOSUL-
European Union Trade Agreement. 
With or without dialogue, U.S. standards have not changed. Even so, in 
2012, President Dilma visited the United States and, once again, the interaction 
was touted as evidence of a new bilateral stage. In 2012, there were no advances 
in Rio+20, which did not enjoy the expected U.S. support. The announcement 
in 2013 that the President would be received, in October, as Head of State in 
Washington only raised these expectations, particularly in the pro-alignment 
sectors that defended the hypothesis of a break in the Lula-Dilma continuum.  
However, there was no break: what prevailed was a tactical adjustment 
towards accommodation. If there was reduction in conflict, it derived from the 
relative retreat of diplomacy, which, in principle, reduced the areas of tension. 
This does not mean that there was convergence between Brazil and the United 
States in the areas of previous disagreements, but it rather means that the 
country was less visible.  
 
 
Detachment, Rethinking and Stagnation (2013/2014) 
From the 2011/2012 assessment, a "positive" year of 2013 was expected; 
however, the detachment of the structural and conjunctural dimensions of the 
relation was going to become more complex and sharp. The short-term visions 
overlapped the analyses of exchange, reducing it to the spying theme given the 
accusations of Edward Snowden published by journalist Glen Greenwald in 
June 2013. These reports indicated that the U.S. maintained a regular practice 
of espionage conducted by their National Security Agency (NSA). The 
justification remained that of safety, aimed at combating transnational 
terrorism. However, the NSA watched enemy nations and allied countries like 
Brazil and Germany (including President Dilma and Chancellor Angela Merkel) 
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and companies in which the U.S. held interest, as energy-sector Petrobras 
(Trinkunas 2013).  
Although one cannot deny the seriousness of the allegations, the 
Snowden case took much larger and media proportions than it should have. In 
different proportions, it assumed a central role in the domestic agenda as the 
Ahstiani case had, and the tendency is to follow suit in terms of emptying. The 
cancellation of the visit of President Dilma as Head of State to the United 
States, scheduled for October 2013, was cited as evidence of conflict. Moreover, 
almost all foreign policy decisions or economic issues involving the United 
States somehow became attributable to the Snowden case. This ignored the 
context in Brazil and the United States in which the NSA outcry arose, as well 
as the institutionalization of bilateral relations. 
Examining this context, and chronologically the relation dynamics of 
from June 2013 to 2014, when Vice President Joe Biden came to Brazil in the 
World Cup to meet with President Dilma, we can observe that the Snowden 
affair represented a strong smoke screen. Although this screen was instrumental 
to both countries, it cannot be turned into the "trigger" of what happened.  
Snowden's allegations were not unprecedented, just take the WikiLeaks 
case. In 2010 the site of Julian Assange released similar information. Snowden 
keeps stating that he has requested political asylum in Brazil, which would not 
have been granted by the government. In turn, the government denies this 
request to be official. In any case, this episode shows that the government does 
not want to confront the U.S. interest. As of August 2014, this issue is still 
pending. Why did the Snowden case reach such repercussions? 
With regard to the United States, the fact that the accusations would 
have been payable to the Obama administration represented the differential 
due to the condemnation by Democrats of these practices. For Brazil, the 
allegations called into question the prior tactical adjustment advocated by pro-
alignment groups, and emerged at a time of relative crisis. The months of June 
and July 2013 were characterized by a wave of protests in major Brazilian cities 
as of the Confederations Cup (with the movement "there won't be Cup").  
These protests, especially in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, had been 
occurring since January, for various reasons: free bus services, anti-political 
parties and anti-corruption sentiment, homeless and landless movements, etc. 
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In 2014, the FIFA World Cup took place and protests were further restricted, 
without broad popular participation. From the beginning, the segmentation of 
agendas and the violence of the Black Blocs indicated that the reach of anti-
government demonstrations was low, evidencing the movement's lack of 
identity and the media utilization by the opposition. In this context, the 
Snowden case came as a relief valve, aiming to support and create facts for a 
new tactical adjustment and the resumption of political initiative. 
In August 2013, we observed a movement of this second adjustment 
with the ousting of Ambassador Patriota as Minister of Foreign Affairs and his 
replacement with Ambassador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado (Patriota 
began to act as Brazil's representative to the UN, a position that had been held 
by Figueiredo). The ousting of Patriota was caused by the episode of the escape 
of Bolivian Senator Roger Pinto Molina to Brazil, with the help of diplomat 
Eduardo Saboia, after almost two years of exile in the Brazilian Embassy in 
Bolivia. In August, Secretary of State John Kerry visited the country as part of 
the preparations for the visit of Dilma in October, which had not been canceled 
yet, and continuing the Strategic Dialogues (Negroponte 2013). 
September and October were marked by the creation of new facts: the 
Snowden crisis led Brazil, in alliance with Germany, to take a leadership role in 
criticizing the espionage and the demand for the regulation of digital media. 
The subject occupied the central place of the President's Statement at the 
Opening of the 68th General Assembly of the United Nations, with strong 
criticism against the United States (Rousseff 2013). 
 
In Brazil, the situation was even more serious, as it emerged that we were targeted 
by this intrusion. Personal data of citizens was intercepted indiscriminately. 
Corporate information - often of high economic and even strategic value - was at the 
center of espionage activity. Also, Brazilian diplomatic missions, among them the 
Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the Office of the President of the 
Republic itself, had their communications intercepted. Tampering in such a manner 
in the affairs of other countries is a breach of International Law and is an affront to 
the principles that must guide the relations among them, especially among friendly 
nations. A sovereign nation can never establish itself to the detriment of another 
sovereign nation. The right to safety of citizens of one country can never be 
guaranteed by violating fundamental human rights of citizens of another country. 
(...) We expressed to the Government of the United States our disapproval, and 
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demanded explanations, apologies and guarantees that such procedures will never 
be repeated. (...) For this reason, Brazil will present proposals for the establishment 
of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet and 
to ensure the effective protection of data that travels through the web (...) (Rousseff 
2013, n/p) 
 
This resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly, in December, of 
the "Right to privacy in the digital age" resolution. This theme became 
symbolic since Dilma had not presented innovations in the history of foreign 
policy until then, keeping Lula's initiatives. Therefore, the espionage theme was 
exploited (its domestic counterpart was the Marco Civil da Internet, an Internet 
bill of rights, approved in 2014). But what about the Brazilian decisions in the 
second half of 2013 that were touted as a result of the Snowden affair and which 
reflect long-term strategic issues? There are two cases worth highlighting: the 
purchase of fighter jets for the Brazilian Air Force and the auction of the Libra 
pre-salt field.  
Started under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, the 
studies for the purchase of the jets had a long trajectory affected by budgetary 
and strategic (access to technology) issues, which resulted in three options: 
Rafalle-France, Boeing-United States and Gripen-Sweden. Quite delayed, the 
decision occurred only in 2013, on an emergency basis, and after the 
deactivation of the national fleet. The option was for the purchase of the 
Swedish GRIPEN NG-SAAB jet, in a contract valued at US$ 4.5 billion. 
According to analyst Roberto Godoy, 
 
The choice of the Swedish Gripen NG will enable the development of a high-
performance national fighter jet - a supersonic with BR designer, created to meet 
specific demands of the Brazilian military aviation. According to the Defense 
Minister, Celso Amorim, such aircraft may be exported. It is the main benefit of the 
proposal of Saab, which also took advantage at the time of closing the deal: it won 
the contract for US$ 4.5 billion, the lowest budget of the three finalists, covering 
the supply of 36 aircraft, parts, components and, of course, the fourth-generation 
technology required by the Air Force at large scale. That means a lot. With the 
knowledge incorporated by the joint program, Embraer - the main aerospace 
agency in the country and designated as Saab's partner - may in the future offer a 
new product in the military market. (...) The announcement of the choice does not 
preclude the immediate crisis of the air defense. (Godoy 2013, n/p) 
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This decision, as well as the partnership with France in the Submarine 
Development Program (PROSUB), in association with the Brazilian Navy, is 
part of a process of modernization of the Armed Forces accelerated by the Lula 
administration. This process aims to restore the defense sector, after its 
dismantling over the 1990s (initiated by Fernando Collor de Mello). Despite the 
establishment of the Brazil-U.S. Defense Dialogue, the choices in the industry 
have been the diversification of partnerships with developed and emerging 
countries, be it for the purchase of equipment and the development of research, 
or for training and joint operations (see IBSAMAR). This concerns the United 
States and the partnership with China is mentioned in the 2014 
USSOUTHCOM strategic posture, 
 
In the defense realm, Chinese technology companies are partnering with Venezuela, 
Brazil, and Bolivia to launch imagery and communications satellites, and China is 
gradually increasing its military outreach, offering educational exchanges with 
many regional militaries. In 2013, the Chinese Navy conducted a goodwill visit in 
Brazil, Chile, and Argentina and conducted its first-ever naval exercise with the 
Argentine Navy. (USSOUTHCOM 2014, 11) 
 
The concern is extended to the pre-salt exploration. Regarding this 
agenda, the Brazilian approach has been the same: the diversification of 
partnerships, and the search for conditions to ensure greater benefits to the 
Brazilian state. In 2013, the auction of the Libra Field was representative of 
this tactic when the consortium formed by Petrobras, Shell (Netherlands), Total 
(France), CNPC and CNOOC (China) acquired the right to explore the field, 
with parcel to Brazil as well as bonus by the concession contract. The non-
participation of Anglo-Saxon companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron, British 
Petroleum and BG was pointed out as a result of the unwillingness of the 
Brazilian government with its U.S. counterpart because of the Snowden case, 
ignoring the fact that these companies did not consider the proposed sharing 
system interesting enough. The perception of the energy problem is, as stated 
previously, a factor that involves hemispheric and African dimensions, 
regarding the advance of the emerging countries in the South Atlantic. In 2014, 
it becomes evident on both the USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM agendas, 
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The African continent‟s energy and strategic mineral reserves are also of growing 
significance to China, India, and other countries in the broader Indian Ocean Basin. 
Africa‟s increasing importance to allies and emerging powers, including China, 
India, and Brazil, provides opportunities to reinforce U.S. security objectives in 
other regions through our engagement on the continent. While most African 
countries prefer to partner with the United States across all sectors, many will 
partner with any country that can increase their security and prosperity. We should 
be deliberate in determining where we leave gaps others may fill. (AFRICOM 
Posture Statement 2014, 5) 
 
Vice-President Joe Biden mentioned the energy theme on a trip to 
Brazil in June 2014: 
 
It is obvious that the potential of cooperation between Brazil and the United States 
in energy is great. Since the creation of the Brazil-U.S. Strategic Energy Dialogue 
(SED) in 2011, we have worked on major challenges in energy and climate change. 
In fact, the SED was formed upon a bilateral cooperation in biofuel, hydrocarbon 
and civil nuclear energy, to name a few that already existed. That is, our 
partnership in energy is already some years old. The U.S. oil companies have been 
active in the oil and gas industry in deep waters in Brazil for many years, while 
Petrobras has a history of deep-water operations in the United States. This is an 
area that each country can contribute with expertise and can benefit from bilateral 
technical and commercial engagement. What we have learned from the partnership 
in the SED is that U.S. service companies are eager to explore partnership 
opportunities for the development of oil and gas reserves in Brazil, including non-
conventional ones. (Lopes 2014) 
 
Held during the World Cup in 2014, this visit was defined by the Vice 
President in an interview with Folha de São Paulo as a "date" between both 
diplomacies, but he underscored that the "worst moments" of the NSA 
espionage post-crisis had been overcome.7 Biden stressed that these noises did 
not prevent the continuation of the dialogue, as well as agendas of cooperation 
and business related to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. Programs like 
                                                 
7 Biden attended the game between the United States and Ghana in Natal, which, in the 1940s, was 
representative of the US-Brazil strategic partnership in World War II, between the governments of 
Getúlio Vargas and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  
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Science Without Borders were highlighted. In a similar tone, President Dilma 
Rousseff, in an interview analysed by O Globo on July 10, 2014 stated: 
 
I do not believe that the responsibility for the habits of espionage is of the Obama 
administration. I think it is a process that has been occurring since September 11. 
What we did not accept and still do not is the fact that the Brazilian government, 
Brazilian companies and Brazilian citizens were spied (...) (Alencastro 2014, n/p) 
 
The Biden-Rousseff statements mean there is interest to change the 
focus. These efforts have their motivations, including instrumental ones: on the 
U.S. side, repositioning on the agenda; for Brazil, to eliminate a subject of 
contestation of foreign policy in the 2014 presidential campaign by the 
opposition. The tactic is unlikely to succeed, since the pro-alignment groups 
have a clear stance: either there is a structural change or criticisms remain. 
Therefore, the question refers not to the government policy, but the state 
policy.  
The bilateral relations from 2011 to 2014 express the traditional 
contradictions of this interaction and its weight in domestic politics, such as the 
U.S. hegemonic power in the quest to preserve its regional and global power. 
Brazil's strengthening emphasized its autonomy, which led to a new U.S. 
perception about the possibilities of cooperation or threats arising from this 
growth. This increased contacts, elevating conflicts. 
The United States retreated internationally due to the economic crisis 
and reinforced the use of strategic and military mechanisms in the pressure on 
Brazil and emerging countries. Ideological instruments and the reaffirmation of 
zones of influence in the Pacific and in Europe, as well as the creation of new 
areas of power projection in Eurasia and Africa offer a counterpoint to regional 
powers. Moreover, concerns about terrorism and drugs remain: 
 
Clan-based, Lebanese Hezbollah-associated criminal networks exploit free trade 
zones and permissive areas in places like Venezuela, and the Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay Tri-Border to engage in money laundering and other illegal endeavors, as 
well as recruitment and radicalization efforts. (…) (USSOUTHCOM Posture 
Command 2014, p. 4) Working with our interagency colleagues and international 
partners, we will assist as appropriate in countering diversified illicit drug 
trafficking and transnational criminal organization networks in Latin America that 
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are expanding in size, scope, and influence. The Department will continue to 
maximize the impact of U.S. presence in Latin America by continuing to foster 
positive security relationships with our partners to maintain peace and security of 
the Western Hemisphere. (Department of Defense 2014) 
 
Thus, we are confronted with a complex picture of socio-political, 
economic and strategic considerations that guide the bilateral relations between 
Brazil and the United States in regional and global terms. Such relations are 
also inserted into a broader framework of transformation in the balance of 
world power. 
 
 
Final Considerations 
As discussed throughout the text, the government of President Dilma Rousseff 
has elements of both continuity and discontinuity when compared to that of 
President Lula. Although there is a continuity of an internal and external 
project of state, retreats on agendas such as the bilateral relations between 
Brazil and the United States indicate some discontinuity, associated with a 
lower external intensity. This was the tone of the first two years of the 
administration between 2011 and 2012, and which was extended to regional and 
multilateral organizations.  
Particularly in bilateral trade with the United States, these tactical 
adjustments do not impact the structural dimensions analyzed here, 
particularly in the U.S. strategic interest in containing the advance of Brazil (or 
any other emerging country). Moreover, they may lead to the risk of weakening 
the Brazilian position. Since 2013/2014, the resumption of assertiveness 
introduced a path correction to this readjustment, which, although it has 
generated new controversy with the United States and the defenders of 
alignment, signaled a commitment to autonomy. 
These oscillations of the Rousseff administration fall into a vision of 
state, under discussion in Brazil, which is not limited to international relations. 
Foreign policy and its definition from the perspective of bilateral relation is a 
component that is present even in the twenty-first century despite all the 
changes in the country, the United States and the world. A realistic relation 
with the United States passes through this assessment, and without it, no 
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agenda can be complete, or suitable to the project of a strong, autonomous and 
fairer Brazil. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article aims to present an analysis of the Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations in 
the Dilma Rousseff administration from 2011 to 2014, from the development of 
the contemporary Brazilian foreign policy in the twenty-first century. In both 
global and regional contexts, it analyzes its political, strategic and economic 
components, opportunities and bottlenecks. 
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